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Abstract: Arrow proposed a set of conditions for a function to aggregate ordinal preferences of the 
members of a group, proving that it was not possible to satisfy all these assumptions simultaneously. 
Later, Keeney adapted these conditions and proposed a cardinal utility axiomatization for the problem 
of aggregating the utility functions. This work discusses the condition of nondictatorship. It proposes 
a stronger formulation for this condition and presents the corresponding characterization of group 
cardinal utility functions. 
Keywords: utility functions, axiomatization, Arrow’s theorem. 
1   Introduction 
This work focuses on the possibility of building a group utility function. There are several proposals of 
axioms for characterizing such a function (e.g., Harsanyi (1955), Keeney and Kirkwood (1975), Dyer and 
Sarin (1979), and Harvey (1999)). We focus here in particular on Keeney’s (1976) group cardinal utility 
axiomatization, which translates to utility theory the conditions put forward by Arrow (1951) for 
aggregating individual rankings into a social ranking.  
The contribution of this work is to revisit and reinterpret the condition of nondictatorship put forward 
by Arrow, in a way that makes it more consistent with common understanding of what is a dictator. A 
stronger condition will be proposed and the corresponding new characterizations of group utility 
functions are derived. 
2   Arrow and Keeney’s Results 
Arrow (1951) addressed the problem of aggregating N individual rankings Ri (i=1,…,N) into a group 
ranking R. Arrow defined that these binary relations should be weak orders. The desideratum for an 
aggregation method would be to obtain a social ranking R also connected and transitive. This method 
should satisfy five seemingly reasonable conditions: Universality, Positive association of social and 
individual values, Independence of irrelevant alternatives, Citizens’ sovereignty, and Nondictatorship.  
Keeney (1976) formulated a group cardinal utility axiomatization for certain and for uncertain 
alternatives. Keeney considered a set of cardinal utilities ui(aj) concerning individuals indexed by i 
(i=1,…,N) and alternatives indexed by j (j=1,…,M) and proposed five assumptions parallel to Arrow’s 
conditions that a group cardinal utility function uG = u(u1,…,uN) should be consistent with. Two main 
results were proved. In the case of certain alternatives, uG is consistent with those five assumptions if and 
only if du/dui ≥ 0, for i=1,…,N, and the inequality is strict for at least two ui’s. In the case of uncertain 
alternatives (aggregation of von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utilities), to be consistent with the five 
assumptions uG needs to be a linear combination of individual utility functions: 
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with ki ≥ 0, for i=1,…,N, and the inequality is strict for at least two ki’s. The ki's are scaling coefficients 
associated with the individuals. 
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3   Strengthening the nondictatorship assumption 
Arrow’s nondictatorship condition states that “The social welfare function is not to be dictatorial”, where 
dictatorial means “that there exists an individual i such that, for all a and b, a Pi b implies a P b regardless 
of the orderings R1,...RN of all individuals other than i, where P is the social preference relation 
corresponding to R1,...RN.” Arrow (1951, p.30). If individual i is a dictator then R = Ri. 
Keeney (1976, p. 142) formulated by analogy a nondictatorship condition (Assumption B5) stating that 
“There is no individual with the property that whenever he prefers alternative a to b, the group will also 
prefer a to b regardless of the other individual’s utilities”. As in the previous case, this implies that if 
individual i is a dictator then the group ranking provided by uG coincides with the ranking implicit in ui. 
The nondictatorship conditions of Arrow and Keeney consider that a dictator is an individual so powerful 
that for any conceivable pair (a,b) in the space of alternatives (not necessarily the actual alternatives that a 
group of individuals is considering), if the dictator (an individual i) deems that a is preferred to b, then 
this yields a P b for the group, no matter how close ui(a) and ui(b) are.  
Consider for instance that uG follows the additive model (1), irrespective of concerning certain or 
uncertain alternatives. Let us also assume that (following a usual convention): 
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 Let us take an example in which an individual (i=1) has a scaling coefficient arbitrarily close to 1: k1 = 1-
ε for a small positive quantity ε (Table 1). Individual 1 is not a dictator in Keeney’s (1976) sense. Indeed, 
no matter how small ε is, we can conceive two alternatives such that uG(b)>uG(a), despite u1(b)<u1(a). 
E.g., if u1(a)=c and u1(b)=c-ε, then uG(b)-uG(a)=ε2>0. 
Table 5.  Example.  
 Individual 1 Individual 2     … Individual N 
ui(a) u1(a) 0 0 
ui(b) u1(b) 1                       … 1 
ki 1-ε k2 kN 
 
Suppose k1=0.9990, k2=k3=0.0005. Individual 1 could argue he is not a dictator because, for instance, if 
u1(a)-u1(b)=0.0001, then individuals 2 and 3 could still make b a winner (namely if u2(a)=u3(a)=0 and 
u2(b)=u3(b)=1). However, this explanation would hardly convince individuals 2 and 3. A common sense 
reasoning that can lead to the sentiment that individual 1 is a dictator is that it is very easy for him to 
impose a winner, regardless of the utilities of all other individuals. For instance, if there are 4 alternatives 
a, b, c, and d, and individual 1 declares, e.g., u1(a)=1, u1(b)=2/3, u1(c)=1/3, u1(d)=0, then he would 
impose the ranking abcd to the group. 
This reasoning acknowledges the possibility of strategic misrepresentation, but in a way that makes it 
more difficult to accept socially than what is usually considered in voting theory. In voting theory a 
method is said to be subject to strategic vote if an individual might get some benefit by voting 
strategically. Nevertheless, the fact that an individual might benefit does not guarantee he will benefit: 
this would require knowing the preferences of the other individuals in advance, and knowing whether 
these other individuals would also vote strategically. 
The type of strategic misrepresentation that we can seek to prevent is arguably much more crucial to the 
acceptability of a group aggregation model: no individual should be able to indicate his (possibly 
misrepresented) preferences in a way that it guarantees that his preferences are reproduced by the group 
regardless. We next propose a condition to avoid such a “strategic dictator”. 
 
Condition IIW (Immunity to imposition of a winner by an individual) 
There is no individual with the property that he can indicate preferences (possibly acting strategically) in 
a way that guarantees that the top alternative in the group’s ranking of the alternatives coincides with the 
individual’s preferred alternative, regardless of all other individual’s preferences. 
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4   Axiomatization 
Since the individual’s utilities can be arbitrarily scaled, we will consider they lay on the [0,1] interval. Let 
uG(ui,0-i) denote the group utility of an alternative that has utility ui for individual i and utility zero for all 
other individuals. Let uG(ui,1-i) denote the group utility of an alternative that has utility ui for individual i 
and utility one for all other individuals. The following propositions characterize a group utility function 
that satisfies Keeney’s assumptions plus Condition IIW: 
 
Proposition 1. A group cardinal utility function over certain alternatives with utilities in [0,1] is 
consistent with Assumptions B1-B4 and IIW if and only if du/dui ≥ 0, for i=1,…,N, with the inequality is 
strict for at least two ui’s (Keeney’s Theorem 1), and there is no individual i such that  
uG(1i,0-i) > uG(0i,1-i). 
Sketch of proof: if i’s preferred alternative is a and he states ui(a)=1 and for all b≠a states ui(b)=0, then 
uG(a)>uG(b), even if all other individuals j≠i state uj(a)=0 and for all b≠a state uj(b)=1. Keeney’s Theorem 
1 yields B1-B4. 
 
Proposition 2. A group cardinal utility function over uncertain alternatives with utilities in [0,1] is 
consistent with Assumptions B1-B4 and IIW if and only if it has the form (1) and ki ≥ 0, for i=1,…,N, and 
there is no individual i such that  
ki > k1 +…+ ki-1  + ki+1  +…+ kN. 
Sketch of proof: simple corollary of Prop. 1 applying (1) together with Keeney’s Theorem 2. 
5   Concluding notes 
We introduced a concept of dictator that is more consistent with the common understanding of that term, 
and derived new conditions for a group utility function. An extension to address the concept of imposing 
a ranking is in progress. 
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